CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Winter 2002, W.B. Fisch Assignment #48
Ch. 12. APPLICATION OF THE POST CIVIL WAR AMEND'TS TO PRIVATE CONDUCT
2. Application of the Constitution to Private Conduct
A. Private Performance of "Government" Functions
Early examples finding state action
Smith v. Allright, p. 1123 (1944): exclusion of black voters from
party primaries
Steele v. L&N RR, p. 1123 (1944): union representing railway
workers under RLA excluding black workers
Marsh v. Alabama, p. 1124 (1946): company town's limits on speech
in "pub.for."
Evans v. Newton, p. 1124 (1966): park donated to city under trust,
private trustee appointed to maintain segregation
FLAGG BROS. V. BROOKS, p. 1125 (1978): "mere permission"
did the state take possession of the property and dispose of it without
a hearing?
did the state do the equivalent, by enacting a statute permitting private
creditors to do this?
suppose there had been no statute, but a simple contract authorizing the
warehouseman to sell the property if not paid: would the bailor's claim
for damages for violation of due process have been legally sufficient?
B. Governmental Enforcement of "Private" Decisions
SHELLEY V. KRAMER, p. 1130 (1948)
did the state impose racial restrictions on the sale of the property in
question?
did the state do the equivalent, by issuing an injunction against the buyers'
taking possession of the property in violation of the private agreement?
how is this case different from Flagg Bros.? should it be regarded
as having been overruled by Flagg Bros.?
Barrows v. Jackson, p. 1135 (1953)
what relief was sought for violation of the restrictive covenant?
should the Court have distinguished this case from Shelley?
Sit-In Cases, p. 1135-36 (1964)
does a city or state impose segregation on private business property, by
applying its trespass ordinance or statute to persons to whom entry is
denied solely on the ground of race?
does a deputized private security guard enforcing private discrimination
become a state actor, because he holds himself out as "a deputy sheriff"?
Griffin v. MD
PENNSYLVANIA V. BOARD OF CITY TRUSTS, p. 1136 (1957)
is a city agency created by state law a state actor, when it functions
solely as trustee for private funds to operate a college, pursuant to the
donor's trust?
is the case different, when a private party is substituted for the city
as trustee?
is this case distinguishable from Evans v. Newton, the donated city
park case?
Powers, Edmonson, and McCollum, pp. 1138-9: litigants
exercising peremptory challenges -- is a criminal defense lawyer or even
a civil litigant a state actor? How does this square with Flagg Bros.?