EUROPEAN UNION LAW
W.B. Fisch, Winter
2006
Assignment #13
C. Community Law in Germany
Constitution arts. 24, 25, p. 297 (1949).
- power to transfer sovereign
powers to intergovernmental institutions by legislation
- direct applicability of
general rules of public international law in domestic law
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, p. 298 (Fed.Const.Ct. 1974) ("Solange
I"). Challenge to the constitutionality of the EEC export
license regulation, requiring a deposit in conjunction with each application
for export license, to be forfeited if the export is not consummated.
- are
the independent individual rights guaranteed by Community law sufficient
to protect fundamental rights of German citizens?
- what
is the source of the fundamental rights rules of Community law?
- can
they be sufficient, if they are not codified?
- do
the individual rights provisions of the German constitution apply to
Community acts, in so far as they are to be applied in German territory?
In Re Application of Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft, p. 301 (Fed.Const.Ct.
1986) ("Solange II")
- what
has happened between 1974 and 1986, regarding the protection of
fundamental rights in Community law?
- is
this aspect of Community law no longer subject to review by the Constitutional Court?
- cf. Kloppenburg,
n. 3 p. 305
- is
a German court bound by the ECJ's ruling that a
directive has direct effect?
- if
a German court considers that the ECJ has wrongly interpreted Community
law concerning direct effect, what option does it have beyond ignoring
the ECJ ruling?
Constitutional Amendments for Maastricht, p. 306
- Amendment process generally,
art. 79:
- 2/3 vote* in each
house of the Parliament
- no amendment is
permissible:
- to change the
division into federal states, or
- to change the
essential participation of the states in the legislative process, or
- to change the
essential principles laid down in the basic rights provisions (arts.
1-20)
- principal
elements of new art. 23 (old art. 23 was the vehicle for reunification in 1990)
- assurance of adherence
of EU to essential principles, including fundamental rights comparable to
those of the Basic Law
- participation of the
two houses, especially the Bundesrat*, in EU
matters
BRUNNER et al. v. THE EUROPEAN UNION TREATY (Maastricht Ruling),
p. 308 (1994): could Germany
constitutionally adopt TEU?
- are
the transfers of sovereignty sufficiently precise to allow for informed
democratic decision?
- do
the institutional arrangements of the EU satisfy fundamental requirements
of democracy?
- what
is the essential nature of the EU: a confederation of states, or a federal
state?
Banana Regulation Rulings, pp. 318-324 (1994-2000):
does Brunner modify or weaken Solange
II?
- Do
GATT rules prevail over EU rules inconsistent with them?
- Do
GATT agreements entered into by an MS prior to the effective date of the treaty
control over Community acts?
- Is the
Banana Regulation consistent with German constitutional law?