il24.out

1. Structure of SC’s powers under Chapter VII (see CB pp. 890-91)

a. art. 39: determine existence of any “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”, and recommend measures

b. art. 41: measures by member states not including force: economic sanctions, etc.

c. art. 42: specific military action by the Security Council, including use of MS forces

d. art. 43: agreements with MS to provide SC with armed forces – unused (Military Staff Committee, art. 47, never came into being)

e. arts. 48-50: duties of member states to carry out measures directed by SC

2. What are the principal obstacles to implementation by the Security Council of the peace-keeping role envisioned by the Charter?

a. Veto power of 5 permanent members?

b. Failure of MS to provide the SC armed forces, assistance and facilities (art. 43)?

c. Failure of member states to pay special assessments?

3. What solutions to these problems have been adopted?

a. “Uniting for Peace Resolution” (1950): GA recommendations for action by MS, when SC fails to act for want of unanimity of permanent members

b. One Cold-War exception to veto impasse: Korea, voted by SC during USSR’s boycott

i. USSR didn’t veto

ii. US and other allies agreed to provide armed forces under nominal UN command for the specific purpose

c. Peacebuilding Commission (est. by SC and GA 2006) designed to help deal with political issues post-conflict

i. 31 Members (member states) with rotating chair

ii. Has funding of $270 million from member states and other entities

iii. Has 4 current projects, all in Africa (Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Central African Republic)

2. The United Nations, Chapter VII, and the Invasion of Kuwait

1. background of Iraq-Kuwait dispute

2. SC Resolution 678, p. 581 (1991)

a. Prior resolutions 660 and 661 responding to the invasion

b. what was the legal basis for res. 678?? What action did the SC take?

i. was it “enforcement action” or “collective self-defense” (Rostow, p.584)

ii. what difference would it make?

iii. specifically, does art. 42 authorize the SC to “authorize” member states to take any action necessary to implement its resolutions, as distinguished from exercising direction and control itself? If not, then were the member states acting in their own interest rather than on behalf of the UN?

3. SC Resolution 687, p. 587

a. what is the SC’s authority for this resolution?

b. in particular, what about

i. settling boundary disputes

ii. imposing compensation duties, backed up by seizing oil production, and

iii. forbidding redevelopment of weapons of mass destruction?

3. The United Nations, Regional Organizations, and Kosovo

1) What are “regional arrangements” within the meaning of Ch. VIII of the UN Charter (CB p. 893ff.)? What limitations are placed on their activities (arts. 52)?

2) Was NATO acting pursuant to Ch. VIII in bombing Serbia in 1999?

a) What previous action had the SC taken with respect to Kosovo? Did that constitute justification for the bombing?

b) Was it an “enforcement action” within the meaning of art. 53?

c) Was NATO’s action ratified by the SC after the fact in Res. 1244? N. 1 p. 596-7

3) Was NATO’s action justified in any event as “humanitarian intervention”?