Property
Servitudes — Flexibility, Termination, and Modification of Servitude Regimes
Reading Assignment: Pages 676-697

1. Lambert buys a home in Quiet Acres, a covenant-restricted subdivision. The CC&Rs for Quiet Acres provide that no lot may be used "for business use," that all lots must be used "for residential purposes only," and that all homes must be constructed such that at least "50% of the exterior building materials consist of brick or stone." Immediately after moving in, Lambert installs vinyl siding on his home and begins operating a web-based business from his basement, selling sports-related paraphernalia that is delivered to purchasers by mail from a warehouse across town. Two years later, Royce (Lambert's next door neighbor) sues Lambert for an injunction to remove the vinyl siding and cease his business operations. Should Royce get an injunction? What additional information would you want in order to make a decision? How do the decisions in Fink v. Miller and West Alameda influence your judgment?

2. Suppose that you had been the attorney advising the neighborhood association involved in the Fink v. Miller case. Given the factual history of the case, can the roofing materials covenant be saved? Can it be "resurrected" in terms of its enforceability, or is it "lost" forever? What steps would you have suggested for the association to follow in order to try to accomplish the "resurrection" of the covenant's enforceability?

3. Suppose that by the time of the litigation in West Alameda, the City had re-zoned the affected land so that the applicable zoning ordinance would have permitted commercial uses like a shopping center. Should this justify a conclusion that the covenant has been terminated due to changed circumstances? Why or why not?

4. Why not allow the developer in West Alameda to build its shopping center and simply pay damages to all of the neighbors whose property value declines? [In other words, why not protect the neighbors with a liability rule rather than a property rule?]

5. What is the function of the 120-foot setback requirement that was approved by majority vote in the Boyles v. Hausmann case? What alternative explanation might exist for the imposition of the 120-foot setback requirement? Why did the court refuse to enforce the 120-foot setback requirement?

6. Suppose that the majority in Boyles had instead voted to:

a. Abolish all of the existing covenants.
b. Adopt a requirement that each lot owner had to place their trash in dog-proof curbside containers (to cut down on trash problems caused by neighborhood dogs).

Do you think that the court in Boyles would have reacted the same way to these "changes"? Why or why not? Would it help or hurt the analysis of the problem in Boyles to analogize the community association to a local government?

7. The Boyles court interprets the amendment provision to make the covenant scheme unamendable for 5 years at a time. Is this a sensible interpretation of the provision? Would it be equally sensible if the stated period were 25 years? Why or why not?